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A cash-in-advance, endogenous growth, economy de￿nes ￿nancial de-
velopment within a banking sector production function as the degree of
scale economies for normalized capital and labor. Less ￿nancially developed
economies have smaller such returns to scale, and can be credit constrained
endogenously by a steeply sloping marginal cost of credit supply. The de-
gree of scale economies uniquely determines the marginal cost curvature
and the unit cost of ￿nancial intermedition, which is expressed in terms of
an interest di⁄erential. The interest di⁄erential result allows for calibration
of the ￿nance production function using industry data. A hypothesis of how
￿nancial development interacts with in￿ ation and growth is tested, using
￿xed e⁄ects panel estimation with endogeneity tests, dynamic panel esti-
mation, and an extended use of multiple in￿ ation rate splines in estimation
of the growth rate.
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Recent work emphasizes that ￿nancial development can lead to more investment
(for example, Ndikumana (2005)), while examining whether ￿nancial development
itself actually causes growth (Manning (2003), Shan (2005), Rousseau and Sylla
(2006)). The traditional ￿nding that the investment-output ratio can positively
a⁄ect growth, put forth in Kormendi and Meguire (1985), is updated by Gillman,
Harris, and MÆtyÆs (2004) on the basis that the investment to output ratio proxies
the real rate of interest that largely determines the growth rate in the theoretic
Euler equation. Including investment in growth regressions along with ￿nancial
development has been found to leave the latter with no direct role per se, as in
Dawson (2003) and Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005). Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005) include the level of output, instead of investment, and ￿nd
no e⁄ect of ￿nancial development per se on growth. However they also include
an interaction term between ￿nancial development and output which they ￿nd
signi￿cant. Gillman et al. include investment in growth regressions amongst re-
gions di⁄ering in their level of development, and ￿nd possible interaction between
in￿ ation and development in the way that they a⁄ect the growth rate. While the
Aghion et al. interaction term suggests the investment role that ￿nancial devel-
opment can play, the Gillman et al. interaction results suggest the exchange role
that ￿nancial development can facilitate.
The possible growth interaction of in￿ ation with ￿nancial development has
had limited focus.1 Part of the di¢ culty here is in providing a standard de￿nition
of ￿nancial development, within a standard monetary growth framework. This
can be viewed as the need to de￿ne ￿nancial development within a decentralized
￿nancial sector in which there exists a robust mixed exchange equilibrium of both
money and credit, or money and interest earning demand deposits. The prob-
lem of ￿nding a mixed equilibrium goes back, for example, to Wallace￿ s (1980)
overlapping generations model, in which there is no unique equilibrium between
money and interest-earning assets that are a substitute for money. Speci￿cally
within the exchange framework, many approaches have been used to establish a
mixed equilibrium, from putting money and credit, or money and demand de-
posits, in the utility function [Lucas and Stokey (1983), Hartley (1988), Englund
and Svensson (1988), Einarsson and Marquis (2001), Christiano, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2003)], to generalized transaction cost functions including both shopping
time [Bansal and Coleman (1996), Goodfriend (1997), Lucas (2000), Gavin and
Kydland (1999),Canzoneri and Diba (2005)], and costly isoquant-like combina-
1Exceptions include for example Paal and Smith (2000) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2001).
1tions of money and demand deposits (Einarsson and Marquis (2002)).
Unlike this previous work, we achieve a mixed money-credit equilibrium at
the point where the marginal cost of money use equals the marginal cost of the
intermediary-supplied credit. This may be closest in spirit to Marquis￿ s approach,
except that our credit is produced in a decentralized sector, rather than having
a generalized transaction cost; and this results in a banking time instead of a
shopping time economy. In using a decentralized intermediary to solve the mixed
equilibrium problem, the paper contributes a novel but parsimonious micro-based
model that has a standard de￿nition of ￿nancial development, within a cash-
in-advance economy. It does this by borrowing from the banking literature a
speci￿cation for the production function. Set also within Lucas (1988) endoge-
nous growth, this enables extension of the theory of how in￿ ation and ￿nancial
development interact and a⁄ect the growth rate, resulting in a testible hypothesis
that is set out and examined empirically.
The intuition of the equilibrium problem that we solve was well put forth by
King and Plosser (1984) as being based in the standard assumption of constant
returns to scale (CRS): "The constant returns to scale structure implies that at
given factor prices the ￿nance industry supply curve is horizontal." When applied
to supplying exchange credit backed by interest-earning-demand-deposits, this ￿ at
marginal cost schedule competes against a similarly ￿ at price of money, being the
nominal interest rate, and there is no equilibrium (Proposition 1).2 The paper here
solves this, following Sealey and Lindley (1977), Clark (1984) and Hancock (1985),
by including the intermediary￿ s funds as a third factor in its CRS production
function. A normalization of output by the quantity of deposit funds leads to a
per unit production function that is less than CRS in the normalized inputs of
labor and capital, per unit of funds, giving a rising, convex, marginal cost curve
per unit of funds.3
The upward-sloping marginal cost not only allows for a unique equilibrium
between money and credit. It suggests an immediate sense of how ￿nancial de-
velopment a⁄ects the equilibrium. With a greater degree of diminishing returns
to labor and capital factors in producing the credit, and a lessor returns to scale
2Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein (1998) and Li (2000) specify a production approach with CRS
in labor and capital for the production of the ￿nancial services. Aiyagari, Braun, and Eckstein
(1998) assumes an exogenous money demand function to pin down a money-credit allocation,
while Li (2000) drops the CRS assumption during the calibration of the model and instead uses
less than constant returns to scale.
3Hansen and Prescott (2005) specify a third factor of production as the number of production
plants, with a normalization by plants. Lucas (2000) and Canzoneri and Diba (2005) normalize
their transaction cost function arguments by the quantity of exchange funds (equal to output).
2in the normalized labor and capital, the convex marginal cost curve has more
curvature. High curvature suggests a "credit-constrained" economy: in the limit
of highest curvature, it is similar to a Keynesian full-output schedule that is hor-
izontal until it reaches capacity and then vertical [see for example Clark, Laxton,
and Rose (2001)]. But here the curvature is an endogenous function that results
given the production function parameter speci￿cation. A high curvature economy
is our candidate to describe a less ￿nancially developed economy. In contrast,
with a lessor degree of diminishing returns to factors, and higher returns to scale
in the normalized labor and capital, the marginal cost is more smoothly rising as
output rises. This is the candidate for the more ￿nancially developed economy.
Thus, in the normalized production function, the degree of economies of scale in
the normalized labor and capital is put forth here as the description of the degree
of development, consistent with other ￿elds.4
One result is that the interest di⁄erential between the government nominal
bond interest rate and the yield received on total deposits exactly equals the de-
gree of the economies of scale (Proposition 2). By approximating the interest
di⁄erential using industry data, this gives a calibration for the degree of the nor-
malized economies of scale. It is then demonstrated that with the advantage of
greater economies of scale comes the disadvantage of possibly higher marginal
costs at low levels of output, because of a lessor curvature of the marginal cost
curve (Proposition 3). This implies a limited but testible proposition that, given
a non-hyperin￿ ation rate of in￿ ation, an increase in ￿nancial development within
the exchange credit sector causes a decrease in the growth rate (Proposition 4).
The empirics of the paper test the proposition with panel data, and endoge-
nous in￿ ation-growth splines, instrumental variables and dynamic panel estima-
tion. These results extend the threshold literature as for example in Drukker,
Gomis-Porqueras, and Hernandez-Verme (2004). Standard ￿nancial development
measures are included, with a focus on the liquidity measure, along with the in-
￿ ation rate and the investment ratio, in explaining growth. Results appear robust
in their support for the model￿ s explanation of ￿nancial development in terms of
economies of scale, and in terms of the di⁄erent standard of ￿nancial development,
but show sensitivity to the spline division points under instrumental variables.
4R E Lucas (2002)Lucas (2001) similarly uses the degree of diminishing returns to indicate
aggregate development in a growth context; such scale economies are de￿ned as in Julien and
Sanz (2005); and economies of scale have been used to characterize development, for example
as in Boldrin and Levine (2005), who considers this in terms of the parameters of a production
technology for new ideas.
32. Representative Agent Model
The model extends Gillman and Kejak (2005b) by decentralizing the ￿nancial
intermediation sector. This results in the similar equilibrium conditions as when
the agent acts in part as a credit supplier, in a Robinson Crusoe fashion (Hicks
1935), except that now the price of the credit services and the pro￿t of the credit
provider is derived, and the consumer supplies labor and capital to the ￿nancial
intermediary and receives explicit wages and rents. Two other di⁄erences are
that both consumption and investment require exchange, while only consumption
requires exchange in Gillman and Kejak; and both capital and labor are inputs
into all three sectors, while capital was not included in the credit production
function in Gillman and Kejak. The main propositions of this paper are robust to
excluding these later extensions, but these add realism for the calibration and are
still consistent with the previous in￿ ation, Tobin (1965) and growth e⁄ects studied
in Gillman and Kejak. Unlike Stockman (1981), with its inverse Tobin e⁄ect
and no leisure or human capital, here in￿ ation causes substitution from goods to
leisure, a rise in the real-wage-to-real-interest-rate ratio, and substitution from
e⁄ective labor to capital in all sectors, resulting in a positive Tobin e⁄ect, except
at very high rates of in￿ ation. This is despite the fact that in￿ ation directly taxes
a fraction of investment that is bought with money, as in the Stockman channel,
because the factor reallocation across sectors dominates this other e⁄ect.5
Although deterministic, it clari￿es the model￿ s structure by setting out its
timing into four sequential sub-sets within each period, called 1) asset trading,
2) working and producing, 3) goods trading, and 4) account settling, with only
2) takes real time. The consumer initially opens with the ￿nancial intermediary
a depository account, both non-interest bearing and interest bearing, is issued a
credit card from the intermediary, and is given a credit limit for purchases made
during good trading. The consumer agrees to have the intermediary pay for the
consumer￿ s credit purchases from the goods producer￿ s store using the consumer￿ s
deposit account, at the end of each period during account settling. The consumer
receives one share of ownership in the intermediary, for every real dollar deposited
in the intermediary, and receives dividends accordingly, during account settling.
The consumer works for, and rents capital to, both the goods producer and the
￿nancial intermediary, and receives the corresponding wages and rental incomes
5A similar model with both consumption and investment requiring exchange, and with capital
and labor used in all three sectors, but without the decentralization of the credit sector, can be
found in Gillman and Kejak (2005a) A related decentralization can be found in Gillman and
Kejak (2004), but without the microfoundations of the credit production function as presented
here.
4through direct deposits into the intermediary account, during account settling.
Also during account settling, the consumer is informed of next period￿ s credit
limit by the intermediary, and then transfers funds from the non-interest bearing
account to the interest-bearing account, just leaving the amount of money needed
for the next period￿ s money purchases in the non-interest bearing account. The
consumer makes purchases using money and the credit card, up to its limit.
The ￿nancial intermediary receives a charter from the government to operate
depositor accounts, buy government bonds, supply credit, and to distribute money
through money machines that can be located at the goods producer￿ s store. The
charter requires solvency and liquidity each period, and provides ownership eq-
uity to the consumer for each unit deposited. Solvency requires that liabilities in
the form of deposits do not exceed assets in the form of money and government
bonds. And liquidity requires that non-interest bearing deposits on call during
goods trading must be 100% backed by money holdings. Each period, the inter-
mediary manages assets and liabilities, and produces exchange credit with labor
and capital.
2.1. Consumer Problem
The representative agent￿ s discounted utility stream depends on the consumption













Exchange is required for both consumption and investment goods, by using
either nominal money, Mt; or credit from the credit card; dt denote the real
quantity of credit, and Pt denoting the nominal goods price. This makes the
exchange constraint:
Mt + Ptdt = Pt(ct + it): (2.2)
Money comes from bank machines linked to nominal non-interest bearing deposit
accounts, denoted by Dn
t ; with the constraint that
D
n
t = Mt: (2.3)
The exchange constraint (2.2) can be rewritten with this substitution in for the
money stock, but this implies a change in the purchasing process: exchange would
be a cashless purchase using only the debit card and no actual money. While
the debit card world is equivalent in most aspects, instead, the assumption will
5continue to be made that the consumer gets the money from a bank machine
before purchasing at the store. Equation (2.3) is a linear production function of
money from the bank machine using deposits; costly fees could be built in with a
more complicated technology.
Its assumed that all expenditures are sourced from the deposit accounts, since
all income is deposited in the accounts. With qt denoting total real deposits, this
means that
Ptqt = Pt (ct + it): (2.4)
These deposits are held in either interest-bearing or non-interest bearing accounts,
with the nominal quantity of each denoted by Di
t and Dn






The consumer￿ s allocation of capital and time constraints are that the shares
of capital and labor across the credit (D), goods (G) and human capital (H)
sectors add up as follows: 1 = sDt + sGt + sHt and 1 ￿ xt = lDt + lGt + lHt: The
nominal income received from capital and labor, with Pt denoting the price of
goods, and rt and wt denoting the real rental and wage rates, is Ptrt(sDt + sGt)kt
and Ptwt(lDt + lGt)ht: Also there is a lump sum government transfer Vt; and a
dividend distribution from the intermediary per share, denoted by ￿￿
Dt; which is
multiplied by the total number of shares, qt, for a total of ￿￿
Dtqt.
Expenditures on consumption and investment, denoted by Pt (ct + it); and the
payment of the fee for credit services, denoted by Pdtdt; subtract from income, as






t ; where Ri
t denotes the interest rate paid on interest-bearing
deposits. Substituting in for qt from equation (2.4), together these items make
the income constraint:
0 = Ptrt (sGt + sDt)kt + Ptwt (lGt + lDt)ht + Vt + ￿
￿
Dt(Ptct + Ptit) (2.5)
￿Ptct ￿ Ptit ￿ Pdtdt ￿ D
i









Human capital is accumulated through a CRS production function using e⁄ec-
tive labor and capital. With AH > 0;and ￿ 2 [0;1]; ht+1 = AH (sHtkt)
1￿￿ (lHtht)
￿+
(1 ￿ ￿h)ht; using the allocation of time and goods constraints to substitute in for
lHt and sHt;
ht+1 = AH[(1 ￿ sGt ￿ sDt)kt]
1￿￿[(1 ￿ lGt ￿ lDt ￿ xt)ht]
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿h)ht: (2.6)
Physical capital changes according to
kt+1 = it + (1 ￿ ￿k)kt: (2.7)
62.2. Financial Intermediary Problem
The intermediary jointly produces credit and manages assets and liabilities. The
production function for credit services is CRS in e⁄ective labor, capital and the
total real deposit funds qt: With AD > 0; and ￿1 2 [0;1]; ￿2 2 [0;1]; and assuming
that ￿1 + ￿2 < 1; the production is given by















The third factor in the production function results because the ￿nancial in-
termediary is supplying jointly two outputs, in which "there is a joint supply of
things...which cannot easily be produced separately; but are joined in a common
origin" [Marshall (1923), p. 222]. Here the credit services and the deposits are
supplied given the supply of funds to the intermediary from the consumer￿ s income
deposits, which are also the purchases of shares in the intermediary at the preset
unit price. As a result, the total deposits are taken as a given to the intermediary
in the production of the credit.
The management of funds is assumed to involve no cost. Deposits are used to
purchase government bonds, denoted by Bt; or are kept as money holdings. The
solvency restriction that assets equal liabilities is given by





And with Rt denoting the nominal rate earned on the bonds, the change in the
assets net of liabilities provides additional income to the intermediary, this being
equal to +Bt+1 ￿ (1 + Rt)Bt + Mt+1 ￿ Mt ￿ Di





The intermediary￿ s competitive pro￿t maximization problem, for joint credit









is the discounted value of the adjusted marginal utility of
income. (Dotsey and Ireland 1995).











pt[Pdtdt ￿ wtlDthtPt ￿ rtsDtktPt
￿Bt+1 + (1 + Rt)Bt ￿ Mt+1 + Mt
+D
i













t = Mt; (2.13)
and the production function for dt in equation (2.8).
Maximizing equation (2.11) subject to (2.8), the ￿rst order conditions can be
written as in terms of average and marginal products, APt and MPt; and marginal































These set the marginal cost of credit funds equal to the value of the marginal
products of e⁄ective labor and capital in producing the credit, the standard price
theoretic conditions for factor markets; and the marginal products are fractions,
￿1 and ￿2; of the average products.
Zero pro￿t for the intermediary means that the intermediary pays out all pro￿t
as dividends to the consumer, given by ￿Dt = ￿￿
Dtqt: Now consider de￿ning the
interest yield of the dividends as the total dividends per unit of credit produced,
or ￿Dt=dt ￿ Rc
t: With this normalization, and substituting in P d
t =Pt = Rt from
the consumer equilibrium conditions, zero pro￿ts can be written as











Now, the other intermediary ￿rst-order conditions equate the interest paid on
interest-bearing deposits to the government bond interest rate,
R
i
t = Rt (2.17)
8(and equate the shadow value of the liquidity constraint to Rt; thereby equating
non-interest-bearing deposits to money holdings). Substituting in for Rt from
equation (2.17) and solving for Rc
t; zero pro￿t implies that Rc
t equals the return











2.3. Goods Producer Problem
The goods producer competitively hires labor and capital for use in its Cobb-








rt = (1 ￿ ￿)AG(lGtht)
￿(sGtkt)
￿￿: (2.20)
Wage and rental payments are contractually owed to the labor and capital
owner (the consumer) only during account settling. The goods producer sells the
goods at its store, and uses the receipts, both money and credit, to pay the wage
and rents the consumer.
2.4. Government Financing Problem
The government uses money seignorage and lump sum taxation Vt to pay interest
on its debt, and returns the rest by a lump sum transfer back to the consumer,
whereby its total liabilities next period are given by
Mt+1 + Bt+1 = Mt + Vt + (1 + Rt)Bt: (2.21)
And it is assumed that the government lends to the intermediary during each
period the amount that the intermediary demands at the given Rt; using the
funds for oversight of the property rights that de￿ne the markets. The rate of
growth of the money supply is assumed constant at ￿:
2.5. Social Resource Constraint
Consolidating the economy￿ s accounts, by substituting into the consumer budget
constraint, in equation (2.5), for the total intermediary nominal pro￿t per period,
9￿Dt = ￿￿
Dtqt; given by equation (2.11), and for the lump sum transfer Vt; given
by the government￿ s budget constraint in equation (2.21), results in the social
resource constraint of
PtrtsGtkt + PtwtlGtht = Ptct + Ptit:
2.6. Equilibrium
2.6.1. De￿nition
The consumer maximizes utility in equation (2.1) subject to the exchange, in-
come, and human capital investment constraints, in equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.5),
(2.6), and (2.7) with respect to ct; xt; lGt; lDt; sGt; sDt; dt; kt+1; ht+1; Di
t+1; Dn
t+1
and Mt+1. The ￿nancial intermediary maximizes discounted pro￿t in equation
(2.11) subject to the CRS production function in (2.8), the solvency constraint
(2.10), and the liquidity constraint (2.13), with respect to dt; lDt; sDt; Bt+1; Di
t+1;
Dn
t+1; and Mt+1; giving the equilibrium conditions (2.14), (2.15), and (2.17). The
goods producer maximizes pro￿t subject to the CRS production function con-
straint (2.18), giving the marginal product conditions (2.19) and (2.20). And the
government￿ s budget constraint (2.21) provides the market clearing condition for
the money market, while the deposit condition (2.4) provides market clearing for
the intermediary￿ s deposit market.
2.6.2. The E⁄ect of In￿ ation on the Balanced Growth Path
Key balanced-growth-path conditions are given here for log-utility, and used to
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wh
; (2.22)
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(1 ￿ x); (2.25)
Rt = Pdt=Pt = wlDh=(￿1d) = rsDk=(￿2d); (2.26)




























At the Friedman optimum, the nominal interest R; given in equation (2.27),
equals zero and no credit is used. But as in￿ ation rises, the agent substitutes
from goods towards leisure while equalizing the margin of the ratio of the shadow
price of goods to leisure, x=(￿c) =
h
1 + ~ R
i
=wh; in equation (2.22). Here ~ R
in equation (2.24) is the average exchange cost per unit of output, a weighted






average cost of using credit, (￿1 + ￿2)R; with the weight d
q: That (￿1 + ￿2)R is
the average cost can be computed by dividing the total cost of credit production
by the total output of credit production. The equalization of marginal exchange
costs in equation (2.26), between money and credit, determine by how much the
exchange cost of consumption rises. And this determines how much substitution
there is from money to credit, as given in equation (2.28), and from goods to
leisure. Substitution towards leisure causes a fall in the human capital return of
rH ￿ "AH(sHk=lHh)(1￿")(1￿x) , given in equation (2.25). The marginal product
of physical capital rK, in equation (2.23), also then falls, as a result of a Tobin-type
substitution from labor to capital across all sectors in response to the higher real
wage rate; the Tobin like rise in sHk=lHh mitigates but does not reverse the fall
in the return to human capital caused by the increase in leisure. The growth rate,
in equation (2.23), falls as R rises since both rH and rK fall. As the in￿ ation rate
continues to rise, the credit substition channel allows the growth rate to decline
at a decreasing rate, as more credit and less leisure is used as the substitute for
the in￿ ation-taxed good (Gillman and Kejak 2005b).
2.6.3. Non-Existence of Equilibrium with ￿1 + ￿2 = 1
Proposition 1: Assume that ￿1 +￿2 = 1; AD = AG; ￿1 = ￿; and log-utility. For
all R < 1; there exists no equilibrium:








; and with ￿1 +
￿2 = 1; then 1 = Ad (lDtht=dt)
￿1 (sDtkt=dt)
￿2 : Equation (2.26) indicates that
lDtht=dt = ￿1Rt=wt; and sDtkt=dt = ￿2Rt=rt: Substituting these into the previous
equation, 1 = AD (￿1Rt=wt)
￿1 (￿2Rt=rt)












(1 ￿ ￿)AG(lGtht)￿(sGtkt)￿￿￿￿2 : With
￿1 = ￿; and AD = AG; the last expression becomes R = 1: But this gives a con-
tradiction since from equation (2.27), with log-utility, R = ￿ + ￿ + ￿￿ < 1:7
Even more simply, if there is no physical capital, but still human capital, and
all production functions are CRS (linear, with ￿1 = 1;wt = AG) while utility is
the log form, then it is always true that Rt = AG=AD and that R = ￿ +￿+￿￿; a
contradiction in general.
2.6.4. The interest di⁄erential
From equation (2.16), the interest di⁄erential equals the average cost of producing
the credit; this can be further simpli￿ed.
Proposition 2: The percentage interest di⁄erential, (Rt ￿ Rc
t)=Rt; equals the
sum of the production parameters, ￿1 + ￿2:
Proof : Dividing ￿Dt in equation (2.11) by Ptdt; substituting in lDtht=dt =
￿1Rt=wt; sDtkt=dt = ￿2Rt=rt; and Pdt=Pt = Rt; from equation (2.26) into the cur-
rent pro￿t ￿Dt=Ptdt, and substituting in Mt = Dn
t ; and Bt = Di
t; from equations
(??), (2.10) and (2.13), it results that ￿Dt=Ptdt ￿ Rc
t = (1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2)Rt: Thus
Rt ￿ Rc
t = (￿1 + ￿2)Rt; and the normalized interest di⁄erential is (Rt ￿ Rc
t)=Rt
= ￿1 + ￿2:
This analytic result facilitates calibration of the credit production function
parameters. For example, if there is a 6% nominal interest rate in short term
treasury bills, and ￿1 +￿2=0.25, then Rc
t=(0.75)(6.0)% = 4.5%. And the interest
di⁄erential is the 1.5%. This illustrative calibration can be re￿ned by using data
of the mutual fund industry, as is done in Section 4.8
3. Financial Development
Changes in the scale parameters ￿1 and ￿2 cause changes in the curvature of the









For ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:1; and AD = 0:5; Figure 1 graphs the production function:
7We thank Toni Braun for a ￿rst version of a related proof.
8"Although many investors try to pick the mutual fund with the best return, they really
should be looking for the mutual fund with the lowest expenses. Studies show that most mutual-
fund managers fail over the long term to beat the indexes. Their shortfall, in fact, tends to













Effective Labor per unit of Output
Effective Capital per unit of Output
Credit per unit of Output
Effective Labor per unit of Output
Effective Capital per unit of Output
Credit per unit of Output
Figure 3.1. Production of Credit
Increases in ￿1 and ￿2 cause a less sharp curvature. The changes in curvature can
also be seen in the marginal cost curves.
Proposition 3. The curvature of the marginal cost of credit ( MC ) is
inversely related to the normalized economies of scale, in the following way: Let










= (1 ￿ ￿)=￿:
Proof: De￿ne the MC per unit of deposits, using equation (2.26) that equates
the marginal cost of using money to the marginal cost of using credit; drop-

























































































it follows immediately, with ￿1 = ￿2; and ￿ ￿ ￿1 + ￿2; that the curvature is
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿:
The proposition indicates that a more ￿nancially developed economy has a less
curved marginal cost, and one with increasingly high marginal costs (convex) as
long as ￿ < 0:5: A less ￿nancially developed economy can be credit constrained
13with a high curvature MC curve, approaching a reverse-L shape.
Figure 2 shows that the MC curvature increases monotonically as ￿ = ￿1+￿2;
where ￿1 = ￿2; increases from its greatest value at 0:06 to its least value at 0:40.
Here the variable values are inserted using the baseline calibration below for a ￿xed
w; r; and Ad; this gives only an approximation of the MC curve for illustrative
purposes, in that w and r are endogenous to the ￿1 and ￿2 values, and change
as these values change. An interest rate of R = 0:15 is also inserted, implying a
decrease in equilibrium credit production as ￿ rises.











Figure 3.2. Marginal Cost of Credit d=q; with Changes in ￿
3.1. E⁄ect of Financial Development on Growth
The role of ￿nancial development can be shown analytically within a no-physical
capital case of the economy.
Proposition 4. In the case with no physical capital, linear production func-
tions for goods and human capital, and log-utility (￿ = " = ￿ = 1; ￿2 = 0); and







an increase in parameter ￿1 causes an increase in leisure x and a decrease in the
growth rate g; i.e. @x=@￿1 > 0 and @g=@￿1 < 0.
Proof : With no physical capital and CRS production of goods and human
capital, c = AGlGh; ￿h = AHlHh￿￿hh; and d
q = AD(lDh=c)￿1: Deriving the closed
14form solution from the ￿rst order conditions along the balanced-path growth rate,




















































































￿1e￿(1￿￿1): Then, for all R <
b R(￿1;AD;AG); it results that @x
@￿1 > 0; and
@g
@￿1 < 0:
Consider how binding is the restriction that R < b R: With the additional
assumption that AG = 1 and AD = 0:91; as in the calibration below, the ￿gure
below shows that the resulting b R ranges above 100% (straight line) for all ￿1;
and so is well-above non-hyperin￿ ation rates to which the model applies. For
example, for ￿1 = 0:15; as in the calibration below, b R = 3:13; and so R needs to
be below 313%. For ￿1 2 (0:5;1); the marginal cost is increasing at a decreasing
rate (concave) contrary to more normal convex marginal cost curves. In the linear
case of ￿1 = 0:5; then b R = 1:33; or 133%, still well above a hyperin￿ ation rate.
And the b R remains well above 1.00 for all ￿1 2 (0:5;1); for which the marginal
cost curve is concave instead of convex as is the case for ￿1 2 (0;0:5):












Figure 3.3. Proposition 3: b R Bounds
Intuitively, an increase in the normalized returns to scale to labor and capital
in credit production, while maintaining a given nominal interest rate, causes a
15more ￿ exible but more costly credit production, less total credit production, a
more inelastic money demand, and more leisure because of a greater use of the
money to leisure channel for avoiding in￿ ation, instead of the money to credit
channel for avoiding in￿ ation. More leisure causes less growth.
4. Calibration and Simulation
Simulation of a calibrated model illustrates Proposition 4 within the full general
equilibrium model of Section 2. The calibration matches stylized facts of the US
economy, following Jones, Manuelli, and Siu (2005). Values of the shares of human
capital in the goods and human capital sectors, ￿ and ", are both set equal to 0.64;
the rates of human and physical capital depreciation, ￿H and ￿K, are both set to
0.1; and the values of the sectoral productivity parameters are set to AG = 1, AH
= 0:577, and AD = 0:909. The average rate of growth of real GDP, g; and average
in￿ ation rate, ￿, are set at 2% and 5%, respectively; and the discount rate ￿ is set
to 0.04. This implies a steady state of money growth, ￿, of 7%. To set working
time lG to 0.17, as in Jones, Rodolfo, and Rossi (1993), the weight for leisure in
the utility function, ￿, is 4.36. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ￿
￿1,
which controls the steepness of the growth-in￿ ation relationship, is set at (1:5)￿1;
within the usual range.
4.1. Credit Sector
The credit production ￿1 and ￿2 are set using US monetary and banking sector
data. The nominal output per capita, Py; equals 41;632 million USD in June
2005. Using M2 data for June 2005, for the money stock, the velocity of money,
y=(M=P); is set equal to 2:27. To approximate ￿1 + ￿2; the interest di⁄erential
formula of Proposition 2 is used, whereby ￿1 + ￿2 = (R ￿ Rc)=R: For a rough
estimate, we use the average annual fee for the American Express credit cards, of
109 USD, for how much interest is paid on average. This implies that the total
interest cost is (R￿Rc)￿d = 109 USD. Then the ratio of this interest cost to the
interest earnings on bonds, Rd; is computed, by estimating the interest earning on
nominal bonds. The average interest rate of 0:0351 during 2005 is multiplied by
the total credit used; the total credit is calculated using income minus the money,
which with a given income of 41;632 and a velocity of 2.27, is equal to 23;292: This
makes the total interest estimate equal to R ￿ d = (0:0351) ￿ 23;292 = 817:5 USD.
The ratio of (R ￿ Rc) ￿ d to R ￿ d, is 109/817.5, giving that ￿1 + ￿2 = 0:133: This
is what might be considered a lower bound estimate for such credit production
16costs, in that it ignores all other costs like late fees; and other credit cards issued
to consumers with higher risks for repayment may be more expensive on average.
On the side of this estimate being an overestimate is the fact that with prompt
payment some credit cards are fee free. Also note that using a higher velocity of
money makes the estimate lower.
With these quali￿cations, the simulation presented below assumes that ￿1 +
￿2 = 0:1; which is then increased to ￿1 + ￿2 = 0:15: The relative proportions
between the physical and human capital shares is the same as in other sectors of
the economy, with ￿1 and ￿2 being set to 0.064 and 0.036, respectively.
4.2. Simulation
The simulation shows a negative relation between in￿ ation and growth. Figure 4.1
shows that this relation becomes more negative with 50% proportional increases
in both ￿1 (0.064 to 0.096) and ￿2 (0.036 to 0.054) to ￿1 + ￿2 = 0:15. Similar
graphs result when only ￿1 is increased, or when only ￿2 is increased.




















Baseline; and 50% increase in ￿1+￿2.
5. Testing the Theoretical Model with Panel Evidence
The theory indicates that, for a given in￿ ation rate, an increase in ￿nancial de-
velopment, as de￿ned in terms of the returns to scale of ￿1+￿2; causes a decrease
in the growth rate. This can be tested using standard growth rate estimations
by extending them to include an interaction term between the in￿ ation rate and
17￿nancial development. The two primary variables for such a regression, on the
basis of the endogenous growth perspective (discussed in GHM), is to include vari-
ables that capture the returns to the two capitals, physical and human. The real
interest rate is the physical capital return and this is proxied by the investment to
output ratio. The in￿ ation rate acts as a systemic tax on human capital, acting
through leisure, and so the in￿ ation rate is included. These variables give the
initial model, which is then extended with an interaction term between in￿ ation
and ￿nancial development in the spirit of Propostion 4.
The measures of ￿nancial development used are the standard ones from Levine,
Loayza, and Beck (2000). However note that with respect to the optimization
model, the measure that may ￿t best is the Liquid Liabilities measure that is
M2/GDP. This most closely ￿ts the type of exchange credit that appears in the
model: a means of exchange provided by the banks that allows for interest to be
earned on the funds during the period. This observation is based on the fact that
while M1 is comprised of non-interest bearing instruments, and some low interest-
bearing instruments, M2 instruments also can be means of exchange, like checks
written against money market accounts to pay o⁄ American Express cards, while
earning more signi￿cant interest rates as does the credit in the model.
5.1. The Econometric Model
The initial econometric model is speci￿ed as






it ￿ + "it; (5.1)
where: git is the real per capita annual rate of growth of GDP of country i in
period t; ￿i an unobservable e⁄ect (or "individual e⁄ect") for country i; ￿t an
unobservable e⁄ect for time period t; and F k
it is the level of ￿nancial intermedi-
ary development as proxied by the k = 3 variables, with unknown weights ￿k
it.
However since the ratio of commercial assets to total banking assets is found
to be generally insigni￿cant, results for this variable are not reported, and only
private and lly results are presented. The variables in the vector Otherit with
unknown weights ￿ include the initial income, trade, and black market variables;
the disturbance term is "it.
The model further proposes that the ￿nancial intermediary e⁄ect, ￿k
it, can be












4 are parameters for the k number of ￿nancial development vari-
ables. Substituting in for ￿k
it gives










it ￿ + "it; (5.3)
where _ pitF k
it represents the interaction between in￿ ation and ￿nancial develop-
ment.
5.2. The Data
The ￿nancial development data is that of Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), as
is the data for output, prices, government expenditure, trade and black market
premiums.9 While the original sample consists of 74 countries over the period
1961-1995, supplementing this data with the investment to output ratio (Econ-
Data) and the money supply (IFS), as used in Gillman, Harris, and MÆtyÆs
(2004), results in reducing the sample to 27 countries with full information on all
required.10
Five-yearly, non-overlapping, data averages are used such that are seven ob-
servations per country. The variables are de￿ned as g; the real per capita growth
in GDP; _ p; the natural log of one plus the CPI rate of in￿ ation; I; the ratio of
gross domestic investment to GDP; y0; the natural log of the real per capita GDP
in the initial period; gov; the natural log of the share of government expenditure
in GDP; trade; the natural log of the share of total international trade in GDP;
and bmp; the natural log of one plus a black market premium.
For the three ￿nancial development variables that are used, the notation is
private; which is the natural log of the ratio of the value of credits by ￿nancial
intermediaries to the private sector relative to GDP; lly; which is the natural log
of the ratio of liquid liabilities of the ￿nancial system to GDP; _ pprivate, which is
the product of _ p and private (an "interaction term"); _ plly;which is the product
of _ p and lly (an alternative interaction term). The third ￿nancial development
variable is the ratio of commercial assets to total banking assets, but these results
are not reported as they generally are dominated by the other two variables.
9We are very grateful to those authors for kindly supplying their data.
10These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Note that for the in￿ ation rate data, 4 data points of the 186
are above 50%, three for Peru and one for Mexico, and there are no negative rates of in￿ ation.
195.3. Estimation Results
A panel data estimation with two-way ￿xed e⁄ects techniques is used since Haus-
man tests indicate the presence of correlations between the observed and unob-
served e⁄ects. With such correlations both ￿xed and random e⁄ects speci￿cations
can yield consistent parameter estimates. In the ￿xed e⁄ects approach the e⁄ects
are treated as constants. In a random e⁄ects approach, instrumental variable (IV)
techniques can be applied. Table 5.1 presents ￿rst the ￿xed e⁄ects approach. In-
￿ ation and the investment ratio are highly signi￿cant with the expected negative
and positive signs respectively. The level of ￿nancial development is consistently
statistically insigni￿cant; results are presented with it removed from the model
except as it enters through the interaction term. The interaction term of ￿nancial
development and in￿ ation for both the _ pprivate and _ plly variables is signi￿cant
and negative. Endogeneity tests indicate that the in￿ ation rate enters exogenously
in models 1 to 3.
Because the Hausman speci￿cation tests suggest possible correlation between
the observed and unobserved e⁄ects, as a further robustness check, this correlation
is accounted for by using a random e⁄ects framework as in Hausman and Taylor
(1981) and Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986). These results indicate a signi￿cant
and negative e⁄ect of the level of ￿nancial intermediation. The interaction term
between in￿ ation and ￿nancial intermediation generally remains signi￿cant and
negative. However a problem is that there is a rejection of the null hypothesis of
valid instruments using the Sargan criteria, and so the results are not reported
here [see Gillman and Harris (2004) for these details]. Thus the baseline model
apparently ￿nds only negative e⁄ects of ￿nancial development, assuming a linear
relation between in￿ ation and growth.
5.4. Threshold E⁄ect Extensions
Non-linear e⁄ects can be estimated by breaking the regression into segments, or
splines, and then looking for threshold levels of in￿ ation with di⁄erentiated mar-
ginal e⁄ects for either side of the threshold value. Some advances in such estimated
thresholds include Hansen (1999), who provides procedures for estimating multiple
unknown breakpoints within the context of a one-way ￿xed e⁄ects panel model.
Hansen (2000) presents distribution theory for the estimation of multiple threshold
e⁄ects for either cross-section or time series data; Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002)
introduce a model selection based procedure which simultaneously estimates the
unknown threshold parameters and their optimal number; and Drukker, Gomis-
Porqueras, and Hernandez-Verme (2004) combine the model selection procedures
20Table 5.1: Growth Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.425 0.458 0.388 0.446
(0.05)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿
_ p -0.250 -0.187 -0.189 -0.206
(0.05)￿￿ (0.04)￿￿ (0.04)￿￿ (0.04)￿￿
I 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿
y0 -0.052 -0.056 -0.053 -0.054
(0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿
gov - - -0.020 -
(0.01)￿￿
trade - - -0.016 -
(0.01)￿￿
bmp - - - -0.028
(0.02)￿
_ pprivate - -0.043 -0.043 -0.058
(0.02)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.02)￿￿




0.735 0.722 0.737 0.727
LR s ￿2
33 169.697 163.91 169.244 167.578
Hausman s ￿2
df 47.34 (4) 50.19 (4) 56.83 (7) 49.03 (5)
Endogeneity s N (0;1) 0.224 1.723 1.056 2.173
NT 186 186 186 186
￿￿Signi￿cant at 5% size (2-sided). ￿Signi￿cant at 10% size (1-sided). LR refers to
Likelihood Ratio tests of ￿i = ￿t = 0;8i;t. Hausman tests are of ￿xed versus
random speci￿cations. Endogeneity tests the null-hypothesis that the in￿ ation
variable is exogenous; the critical value is 1.96.
21of Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002) with the panel data aspects of Hansen (1999) in
estimating one-way ￿xed e⁄ects for the non-linear e⁄ect of in￿ ation on growth.
Here a multiple threshold approach is developed and applied to panel data for
the in￿ ation-growth relation as an extension of the model in equation (4.3). The
threshold results come from several novel econometric extensions. These are that
two-way country (individual) and time ￿xed e⁄ects are used in the panel￿ s en-
dogenously determined splines, as compared to one-way (individual) ￿xed e⁄ects
in Drukker, Gomis-Porqueras, and Hernandez-Verme (2004); the use of instrumen-
tal variables where the splined variable is potentially endogenous; the application
of the model selections criteria to choose simultaneously across both the model
type (OLS, one-way panel, two-way panel) and the number of breakpoints (thresh-
olds); and the estimation of the multiple endogenous splines when they are forced
to be piecewise continuous. The methodology of these extensions is presented in
the Appendix A.3.
The econometric model is estimated without any unobserved e⁄ects (labelled
OLS), with ￿xed unobserved country e⁄ects (1 ￿ Way), and with ￿xed unob-
served country and time e⁄ects (2 ￿ Way). Table 5.2 presents the results for
the estimated breakpoints in terms of the in￿ ation rate using each method, and
for the optimal number of thresholds for each method and overall as based on
the Information Criterion (IC) procedure detailed in Appendix A.3.1-A.3.2. The
procedure is undertaken for both tied and untied spline functions; see Appendix
A.3.3. Although IC methods are used to ascertain the optimal number of break-
points, the estimation procedure works sequentially, implying in a sense that the
￿rst breakpoint reported in Table 4.2, which is the ￿rst found in the estimation, is
the "strongest" one, the second reported in the table is less strong, and the third
the least strong.
When lly is used, the optimal combination of number of untied breakpoints and
estimation method is 2 ￿ Way with two splines; with the breakpoints occurring
at in￿ ation rates of 16% and 23% (the optimal number is zero for OLS and
two for 1 ￿ Way). Note that both the 1 ￿ Way and 2 ￿ Way select the same
number and value of breakpoints. If private is used as the proxy for ￿nancial
development, again 2 ￿ Way is preferred. Here there are three thresholds at 4,
16 and 23% rates of in￿ ation, similar to the lly results in that the 16% and 23%
breakpoints coincide. Forcing the spline function to be piecewise continuous, the
optimal model for both lly and private is 2 ￿ Way. For both there is now only
one threshold e⁄ect at a 3% rate of in￿ ation.
Table 5.3 contains the estimation results corresponding to the estimated thresh-
old values of Table 5.2. All of the estimations presented are undertaken using
22Table 5.2: Estimated Threshold E⁄ects
Breaks OLS 1 ￿ Way 2 ￿ Way OLS 1 ￿ Way 2 ￿ Way
lly : untied private : untied
0 * - -
1 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.07￿ 0.23 0.23
2 0.23 0.23￿ 0.16￿￿ 0.23 0.16￿ 0.16
3 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.04￿￿
lly : tied private : tied
0 * - -
1 0.23 0.03 0.03￿￿ 0.23￿ 0.23 0.03￿￿
2 0.07 0.05￿ 0.04 0.07 0.05￿ 0.04
3 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.23
￿￿Preferred model overall (based on minimum IC). ￿Preferred model for each estimation pro-
cedure (based on minimum IC).
2 ￿ Way ￿xed e⁄ects and correspond to the optimally chosen model and number
of breakpoints. With regard to the variables I; y0; and the interaction term be-
tween in￿ ation and ￿nancial development, results vary little across speci￿cations
and in comparison to Table 5.1. Investment has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
on growth; initial GDP has a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect, as does the interaction
term, while the level of ￿nancial development has a insigni￿cant negative e⁄ect.
For the in￿ ation rate, the lly proxy shows a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect at all levels;
the private proxy shows an insigni￿cant positive e⁄ect at low levels and a signi￿-
cant negative e⁄ect at all other levels. Forcing the in￿ ation-growth splines to be
piecewise continuous, the e⁄ect of in￿ ation at low levels up to 3% is signi￿cant
and positive for both proxies. However these later results with a positive e⁄ect at
low levels are not robust to using instrumental variables, as the next subsection
indicates.
Another way to compare Models 1 to 4 in Table 4.3 is using the Information
Criterion numbers. These are ￿3:1646 for lly not tied, ￿3:1362 for lly tied,
￿3:1287 for private not tied, and ￿3:0831 for private tied. With a lower IC
value being a better one, this indicates that the models using lly are the preferred
ones, and that the results not forcing the continuity of the splines are preferred
over the tied spline results for both ￿nancial development proxies. Model 1 is the
preferred model.
23Table 5.3: Threshold Growth Results: Standard Errors in Paranetheses.
lly private
untied tied untied tied
Constant 0.511 0.513 0.542 0.559
(0.06)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿
I 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿
y0 -0.061 -0.062 -0.064 -0.066
(0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿
_ pFD -0.049 -0.074 -0.011 -0.034
(0.02)￿￿ (0.02)￿￿ (0.02) (0.02)￿￿
FD -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
_ plow -0.214 0.222 0.093 0.252
(0.05)￿￿ (0.10)￿￿ (0.13) (0.11)￿￿
_ pmedium -0.278 - -0.131
(0.05)￿￿ - (0.05)￿￿
_ pmedium￿high -0.180 -0.215
(0.05)￿￿ (0.04)￿￿




0.736 0.723 0.733 0.708
NT 175 175 175 175
￿￿Signi￿cant at 5% size (2-sided). ￿Signi￿cant at 10% size (1-sided). FD refers to the appro-
priate measure of ￿nancial development.
245.5. Simultaneity Bias
Using splines it is di¢ cult to test for endogeneity in the splined variable, in this
case the in￿ ation rate. However an instrumental variables (IV) estimation can be
made and the results can then be compared to the Table 4.3. For the estimation
with IVs, a procedure similar to two-stage least squares is used. First ￿tted values
of in￿ ation are constructed by regressing it against all of the exogenous variables
in the model plus a money supply instruments. The observed in￿ ation rate is then
replaced by its ￿tted value b _ pit and the spline procedure as described above is then
implemented on b _ pit as opposed to _ pit: To take into account the issue of generated
regressors, coe¢ cient standard errors are estimated by bootstrap methods. Note
that the sample loses one time period and one country due to missing observations
on the money supply and this means that the procedure searches over somewhat
di⁄erent ranges of in￿ ation.
Table 5.4 presents the IV results for the optimal number and position of the
breakpoints. Using lly and a piecewise discontinuous function, the optimal model
now is OLS with two breakpoints at 8% and 17% rates of in￿ ation, as compared to
the optimal 2￿Way with two breakpoints at 3% and 16% in Table 5.2. However
the test statistic that choses OLS as optimal is very close to the test statistics for
the 1 ￿ Way and 2 ￿ Way. For private untied; the optimal choice is OLS with
3 breakpoints as compared to 2 ￿ way with 3 breakpoints in Table 5.2.
Table 5.4: Estimated Threshold E⁄ects using IVs
Breaks OLS 1 ￿ Way 2 ￿ Way OLS 1 ￿ Way 2 ￿ Way
lly : untied private : untied
0 - - -
1 0.17 0.28￿ 0.18 0.10 0.29 0.05
2 0.08￿￿ 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.09
3 0.11 0.04 0.15￿ 0.11￿￿ 0.11￿ 0.03￿
lly : tied private : tied
0 - - -
1 0.08 0.04￿ 0.05 0.11￿￿ 0.11 0.15
2 0.29￿￿ 0.05 0.04￿ 0.10 0.13 0.05
3 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.15￿ 0.09￿
￿￿Preferred model overall (based on minimum IC). ￿Preferred model for each estimation pro-
cedure (based on minimum IC).
25Table 5.5: IV Threshold Growth Results: Standard Errors in Paranetheses.
lly private
untied tied untied tied
Constant 0.045 0.015 0.095 0.024
(0.03)￿ (0.02) (0.10) (0.02)
I 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00)￿￿￿ (0.00) (0.00)￿￿ (0.00)￿￿￿
y0 -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.005
(0.00)￿￿￿ (0.00) (0.01)￿ (0.00)￿￿￿
_ pFD -0.142 0.053 -0.209 0.217
(0.08)￿￿ (0.05) (0.40) (0.05)￿￿￿
FD -0.008 -0.015 -0.001 -0.014
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)￿￿￿
_ plow -0.397 0.170 -0.647 0.163
(0.26)￿ (0.07) (1.18) (0.07)￿￿￿
_ plow=medium - - -0.748 -
- - (1.15) -
_ pmedium=high -0.535 -0.148 -0.900 -
(0.20)￿￿￿ (0.88) (1.13) -
_ phigh -0.379 0.046 -0.640 0.532
(0.16)￿￿￿ (0.11) (1.08) (0.14)￿￿￿
R
2 0.457 0.434 0.456 0.457
Sargan 0.430 0.078 0.022 0.072
NT 144 144 144 144
￿￿￿Signi￿cant at 5% size (2-sided). ￿￿Signi￿cant at 5% size (1-sided);￿Signi￿cant at 10% size
(1-sided); Sargan refers to the bootstrapped empirical p￿value of the Sargan statistic for in-
strument validity, accept H0 of valid instruments for p > 0:05:
Table 5.5 presents the regression results corresponding to the optimal model as
indicated in Table 5.4. The results that pass the Sargan test are those using lly
untied: As in previous ￿ndings, I; y0 and the interaction of ￿nancial development
and in￿ ation are all signi￿cant, and once more the level of ￿nancial development
is insigni￿cant. All levels of in￿ ation have a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect, although
weaker at lower levels. For private untied; the model fails the Sargan test. Forc-
ing the continuity of the splines, the tied results for lly and private suggest that
in￿ ation positively a⁄ects growth in ranges, but the Sargan statistic that indicate
instruments with borderline validity.11
11These are bootstrapped empirical values of the standard Sargan test.
265.6. A Dynamic Growth Approach
Finally, consider for robustness dynamic growth equations. Here the basic model
is extended by including lagged growth, gi;t￿1. For the dynamic panel model the
usual estimation techniques are inconsistent. To allow for growth to follow an
autoregressive process while removing the unobserved e⁄ects, it is common to
write the model in terms of ￿rst di⁄erences and including a lagged dependent
variable
￿git = ￿￿gi;t￿1 + ￿x
0
it￿ + ￿"it: (5.4)
Following Arellano and Bond (1991) it is possible to consistently estimate the
model by GMM estimation based upon the moment conditions,
E (￿"itgi;t￿j) = 0; j = 2;:::;t ￿ 1; t = 3;:::;T: (5.5)
The moment conditions imply that the ￿"it do not follow a second-order serial
correlation process, a condition that is tested here.
Table 5.6: Dynamic Growth Results




_ plly -0.058 (0.02)￿￿
lly 0.000 (0.01)
_ p ￿ 1(_ p < 16%) -0.166 (0.04)￿￿
_ p ￿ 1(16% ￿ _ p < 23%) -0.244 (0.04)￿￿






￿￿Signi￿cant at 5% size (2-sided). Sargan refers to the p￿value of the Sargan statistic for
instrument validity, accept H0 of valid instruments for p > 0:05: m2 tests for second-order serial
correlation and is ~ aN (0;1) under the null hypothesis.
The results of the instrumental variables estimation of the previous subsection
indicate a greater validity for the lly proxy of ￿nancial development, with discon-
tinuous splines. Here this model is used (Model 1 in Table 4.3) and it is assumed
27that the true threshold model has two breakpoints as found in both Table 5.2 and
Table 5.4. Re-estimating the model with the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable as in equation (5.4), Table 5.6 presents the results.
The model passes the Sargan test for instrument validity and indicates results
consistent with Tables 5.3 and 5.5 in terms of the signi￿cance and signs of the
explanatory variables. The growth process is autoregressive with the lagged de-
pendent variable being strongly signi￿cant. This variable￿ s negative sign indicates
a cyclical return to the equilibrium growth path following a shock. The strong
signi￿cance of the lagged growth term while the remaining variables have similar
e⁄ects to the static estimations suggests that the potential omitted variable bias
arising from the previous exclusion of gi;t￿1 is small. Note that there is some
evidence that the ￿"it follow a second-order serial correlation process.
6. Discussion
Related models of intermediation include the "limited participation" model, such
as Fuerst (1994), Fuerst (1995), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), Dotsey and
Ireland (1995), Einarsson and Marquis (2001), Canova (2002), and Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2003). Typically, the consumer lends the wage funds to
the bank as interest-bearing deposits and the bank lends them to the ￿rm. The
interest-paying deposits equal the loans to ￿rms needed for wages and capital
expenses, so that the inputs are bought with loan credit. This gives a mixed
cash/credit equilibrium with the disadvantage of a rigid structure of what is a
cash good and what is a credit good. Many of these models assume no costs
of intermediation, with no interest di⁄erential between the depositor and lender
rates except when there is a positive reserve requirement on deposits. This is a
result consistent with Fama (1980), who postulates a Modigliani-Miller theorem of
￿nance as applied to banks in which, without intermediation costs, only the reserve
requirements imposed by banks give them value. In this case only the reserve
requirements create a spread between depositor and loan interest rates, which is
often the basis for valuing the output of banks (Wang 2003). More generally, the
value of banks, and the interest di⁄erential, would include the resource cost of the
intermediation e⁄orts [Baltensperger (1980), Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004)].
With positive costs assumed for providing interest-bearing deposits or credit,
models since Baumol-Tobin have used di⁄erent devices to derive a mixed ex-
change equilibrium. In Baumol (1952)-Tobin (1956), the marginal cost of getting
interest-bearing deposits (using banking) equals the marginal cost of money, being
the nominal interest rate. Baltensperger (1980) focuses on the problem of a unique
28interior solution for the costly supply of intermediation services in partial equilib-
rium. He speci￿es that the production function must be of decreasing returns to
scale in capital and labor, or that there needs to be a convex cost function, so that
the constant marginal revenue per unit of funds equals the marginal cost per unit
funds, which rises with the level of services output.12 Berk and Green (2004) take
a related approach in their partial equilibrium study of mutual funds intermedi-
ation, specifying a convex cost function. And Wang, Basu, and Fernald (2004)
similarly assume an exogenous convex marginal cost for a variety of value-added
bank services.
In general equilibrium, the rising-marginal-cost principle emerges in models
with costly credit but without an explicit intermediation sector. Gillman (1993),
Ireland (1994), Khan, King, and Wolman (2000), Erosa and Ventura (2000) use
monotonically varying costs across a continuum of stores, with the marginal credit
store being where the marginal cost of credit equals the nominal interest rate.
But the store continuums used here do not easily integrate into the one-good
neoclassical model. And the lack of a ￿nancial intermediary makes it di¢ cult to
de￿ne ￿nancial development.
In terms of the empirical results, they are robust with respect primarily to the
ratio of liquid ￿nancial assets to GDP, the ￿nancial development measure that best
corresponds to the model. Using instead the private credit variable, indicates for
example a positive e⁄ect of in￿ ation at low levels of the in￿ ation rate that is not
robust to considerations of endogeneity of the in￿ ation rate, since the in￿ ation
rate is insigni￿cant at all levels for the IV results. The IV results are important
to consider since such endogeneity can be suspected a priori at low in￿ ation rates
because of the interaction of the business cycle with the price level. The price
level has been found to co-move with output in the short run (Den Haan 2000),
which is a manifestation of how low levels of the measured in￿ ation rate and the
output level could be simultaneously determined. However this can be more of
a relative price change involving changes in the aggregate price level due to real
output changes over the business cycle than to monetary, in￿ ation-type, e⁄ects
and so it should be controlled for with instruments. Use of the money supply as
an instrument is also found in Gillman, Harris, and MÆtyÆs (2004).
The other way in which a positive e⁄ect of in￿ ation at low levels is replicated is
through a procedure to force the multiple splines to be piecewise continuous. But
this approach yields consistently worse results using the Information Criterion and
so is found to involve a nontrivial assumption that can yield misleading results.
The models without the tied-spline assumption perform better.
12Baltensperger (1980), pp. 14, 17, 31, equations (15) and 21).
29For other variables in the econometric model, the investment ratio has a robust
postive e⁄ect; the initial value of GDP has a robust negative e⁄ect, as consistent
with transitional dynamics (see Gillman, Harris, and MÆtyÆs (2004)). By itself the
level of ￿nancial development is robustly insigni￿cant; but note that the standard
results of a positive ￿nancial development e⁄ect can be replicated with the data
set. These results are not reported because they lack signi￿cant missing variables.
For example, using the private credit measure of ￿nancial development and the
black market variable, but excluding the investment ratio, the results show a
signi￿cant ￿nancial development variable at the 1% level (two-sided). And here a
signi￿cant negative in￿ ation e⁄ect is replicated at a 5% level of signi￿cance (one-
sided). Or, excluding only the investment ratio from the Model 1 in Table 5.1,
while using the liquid liabilities measure of ￿nancial development, ￿nds that the
level of ￿nancial development is positive while the interaction term is negative,
although both with weak levels of signi￿cance (t￿statistics respectively of 1.296
and -1.182). Finally, in the reported results, the level of ￿nancial development
robustly has a negative e⁄ect on growth through its interaction term with the
in￿ ation rate.
7. Conclusion
The optimization model has a unique equilibrium between non-interest-bearing
and interest bearing means of exchange, using intermediary structural parameters
instead of free utility or transaction cost parameters, and providing an intuitive de-
￿nition of ￿nancial development based on the production function borrowed from
the banking literature. As a result, the theory modestly extends the mainstream
monetary general equilibrium model towards a fuller integration of ￿nance. The
implied money demand function is characterized by a unitary income elasticity
and a plausible Cagan (1956) type interest elasticity (Mark and Sul 2003). This
plausibility is important in that the money demand derives partly from the inter-
mediary production function and provides another re￿ ection of its speci￿cation;
also the money demand, as Lucas (2000) shows in a related model, determines
the welfare cost of in￿ ation. Here such welfare cost comes from the use of both
intermediary resources and leisure to avoid in￿ ation. And ￿nancial development,
in terms of greater economies of scale, here counterintuitively implies more in-
termediary resources used to avoid the in￿ ation tax, a disadvantage of achieving
greater ￿ exibility in expanding output at all levels of the in￿ ation rate without
the constraint of a rapidly rising marginal cost. The implication is that develop-
ing countries, for a given rate of in￿ ation, may incur less such costs of avoidance,
30using technology with less scope such as limited banking, including exchange for
foreign currency as a type of bank-provided means to avoid the in￿ ation tax.13
The model provides a formal basis to investigate the interaction with in￿ ation
of ￿nancial development on one type of intermediation service. Other types of
￿nancial intermediation might be included, each with its own production function
and similarly derived interest di⁄erentials, such as the cost of buying a market
portfolio, or of buying government bonds. Further, here there is no actual dif-
ference between short and long run securities, making di¢ cult an explanation of
the term structure puzzle as in Bansal and Coleman (1996). And the liquidity
e⁄ect from open market operations is not present by construction, but might be
investigated by building a fuller capital market.
Given such quali￿cations, and in summary, the paper presents a general equi-
librium monetary model with an exchange constraint that is determined by the
production of credit and the free substitution between money and credit to buy
output. The model is used to analyse how ￿nancial development a⁄ects the
in￿ ation-growth pro￿le. E⁄ects of changes in the economies of scale are shown
graphically in terms of marginal cost, in an analytic solution of the ￿nancial inter-
mediary problem, and also in numerical simulations of the in￿ ation-growth e⁄ect.
Extensive empirical results ￿nd support for the proposition of a negative interac-
tion e⁄ect of ￿nancial development and in￿ ation upon growth. These results show
robustness across multiple threshold testing, instrumental variable estimation and
dynamic panel estimation.
A. Appendix
A.1. Multiple Threshold E⁄ects
The threshold model, for two regimes, considered in Hansen (1999) and Drukker,
Gomis-Porqueras, and Hernandez-Verme (2004) is of the form git = ￿i + x0
it￿ +
￿1 _ pit￿1(_ pit ￿ ￿￿
1)+￿2 _ pit￿1(_ pit > ￿￿
1)+"it:This can be written more compactly;
by de￿ning _ pit (￿￿
1) ￿ [_ pit ￿ 1(_ pit ￿ ￿￿
1); _ pit ￿ 1(_ pit > ￿￿
1)]; ￿ ￿ (￿1;￿2)
0 :
git = ￿i + x
0
it￿ + _ pit (￿
￿
1)￿ + "it: (A.1)
Here xit is the vector of explanatory variables net of the splined variable. Thus if
in￿ ation is less than or equal to the (unknown) threshold value ￿￿
1, its marginal
e⁄ect on growth is given by ￿1 and by ￿2 otherwise. For identi￿cation, xit cannot
13Cziraky and Gillman (2006) ￿nd evidence of the limited use of banking for exchange credit
in Croatia since its stabilization after its early 90s hyperin￿ ation.
31contain any time-invariant variables; it is also assumed that the threshold e⁄ects
are time-invariant. The error term, "it; is iid with zero mean and ￿nite variance,
￿2
":
The usual approach to estimating one-way panel models, is to use the Within
operator to transform the variables into di⁄erences from time means for each i
and then to apply ordinary least squares (OLS) to the transformed model (MÆtyÆs
and Sevestre 2005). For the unsplined variables, the transformation is such that
for typical element of x we have x￿
it = xit ￿ x, with xi: = T ￿1 PT
t=1 xit: For
the in￿ ation variable the relevant transformation is _ pit (￿￿
1) = T ￿1 PT
t=1 _ pit (￿￿
1) = h
T ￿1 PT
t=1 _ pit ￿ 1(_ pit ￿ ￿￿
1);T ￿1 PT
t=1 _ pit ￿ 1(_ pit > ￿￿
1)
i
: With G￿;X￿ and _ P￿ de-
￿ned as the matrix stacked versions of g￿
it;x￿
it and _ p￿
it respectively, the estimat-
ing equation is G￿ = X￿￿ + _ P￿ (￿￿











0 ; this rewrites as G￿ = Z￿ (￿￿
1)￿ + "
￿:For any given value of ￿￿
1; the




















￿￿1 : However, ￿￿
1 is unknown. The estimation
procedure (Chan 1993, Hansen 1999, Hansen 2000, Gonzalo and Pitarakis 2002)
involves a grid search over all possible values of ￿￿
1; while ensuring that a su¢ -
ciently large number of observations (￿%) lie in each regime (￿ is set equal to
5%). The optimal value of ￿￿
1 is obtained by minimising the concentrated sum
of squared errors, which means choosing the value of ￿￿
1 that yields the smallest
sum of squared errors (SSE) over the grid-searched possible values of ￿￿
1. In prac-
tice, the sorting is on the observed _ pit with search between the ￿% and (1 ￿ ￿)%
quantile.
It is possible that there may be several such threshold e⁄ects. A convenient
result is that sequential estimation of the breakpoints is consistent (see Chong
1994, Bai 1997, Bai and Perron 1998, Hansen 1999, Hansen 2000, Gonzalo and
Pitarakis 2002). This suggests a procedure to estimate multiple breakpoints:
estimate the single threshold point; ￿x the ￿rst stage estimate at b ￿
￿
1; conditional on
this estimate, repeat the procedure to ￿nd b ￿
￿
2; with both b ￿
￿
1 and b ￿
￿
2 treated as ￿xed,
repeat the procedure to ￿nd b ￿
￿
3; continue for m = 1;:::;M possible breakpoints.
In subsequent grid searches, the range over which to search is reduced so as to
ensure a minimum number of observations (￿%) in each regime.
A.1.1. Model Selection Criteria
Hansen (1999) and Hansen (2000) suggest using bootstrapped versions of likeli-
32hood ratio statistics to determine the optimal number of breakpoints. Gonzalo and
Pitarakis (2002) alternatively o⁄er an appealing approach of choosing the model









S [k￿ (m)]; where S is the sample size, k￿ is the number
of freely estimated response parameters that in turn are functions of m; and !S
is a penalty term, typically a function of the sample size.14 Gonzalo and Pitarakis
(2002) suggest that !S = ln(S); which corresponds to a Bayesian Information
Criteria, performs the best.
This procedure can be adapted to the panel data by letting S = NT; with
k￿ (m) re￿ ecting the reduction in degrees of freedom involved in the panel estima-
tion. This involves a loss of N ￿ 1 degrees of freedom for a ￿xed e⁄ects one-way
model and of (N ￿ 1)(T ￿ 1) degrees of freedom for a ￿xed e⁄ects two-way model.
A.1.2. Time e⁄ects
As it currently stands, equation (A.1), or its multiple regime counterpart, is in-
consistent with equation (5.3) due the former￿ s omission of the time, or business
cycle, e⁄ects of ￿t:15 Time e⁄ects can be incorporated into the threshold procedure
described above. The relevant data transformations for a typical element of x are
x￿
it = xit￿xi:￿x:t+x; with the appropriate de￿nition of the time, individual and
overall mean variables. Applied to the splined variable (_ pit), it needs to be de-
termined if there are unobserved time and/or country e⁄ects present in the data,
and what are the optimal number of breakpoints in the in￿ ation-growth pro￿le.
Devising such a testing procedure is complicated since for example a two-way
￿xed e⁄ects panel model can yield a di⁄erent optimal value of m as compared to
a simple OLS model. An alternative approach is to use the Information Criteria
procedure suggested by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002) to choose both across m
and among estimation technique (OLS, one- and two-way models), once appro-
priate degrees of freedom corrections have been made to k￿ (m): That is, ￿x M;
estimate for m = 0;:::;M the model by each of the three estimation procedures;




the optimal model with regard to the m number of breakpoints and the estimation




14For example, if the total number of explanatory variables, including the in￿ ation variable is
denoted k; and m = 0; then k￿ (m) = k; for m = 1; k￿ (m) = k+1 and for m = 2;k￿ (m) = k+2:
15In the baseline model, which is an unsplined speci￿cation, there is a clear rejection of both
of the null hypotheses: H0 : ￿t = 0 and ￿i = 0; for all t;i and H0 : ￿t = 0; for all t:
33A.1.3. Tied versus Untied Splines
The in￿ ation-growth relation with thresholds may be assumed to be piecewise
continuous or allowed to be discontinuous at the spline knot. To force the relation-
ship to be continuous, as is made explicit in Tables 4.2-4.5, it is possible to follow
Greene (2003), p.122, and re-de￿ne _ pit (￿￿
1) as _ pit (￿￿
1) = [_ pit;(_ pit ￿ ￿￿
1) ￿ 1(_ pit > ￿￿
1)]:
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